Why Banks Are Better at Making Loans Than Modifying Them
Originally posted in November 2009.
According to just about everyone on television and in print these days, should a homeowner get the crazy idea that they might be able to avoid losing their home to foreclosure through a loan modification, the thing they should do is call their bank and, I would assume, ask for one. I say āI would assumeā because no one on television or in print has offered anything more detailed in the way of instruction than to say: āCall your bank.ā So, alrighty thenā¦ fair enough.
~~~
Being that I had some extra time this morning, I thoughtā¦ what the heckā¦ the guy on 20/20 said it would work so he must know, right? So, I decided to call my own mortgage holderā¦ First Nationalized Bank.
Ringā¦ ringā¦ ringā¦ Thank you for calling First Nationalized Bank. If you know the extension of the person you are calling you may enter it now. For the company directory, press 9. (Silenceā¦)
If you are calling about a checking or savings account, press 1. For credit cards, press 2. Auto loansā¦ 3. Other optionsā¦ press 4. (I pressed 4.)
(Ringā¦ ringā¦ ringā¦.) You have reached First Nationalized Bank. For questions about home mortgages press 5ā¦ for questions aboutā¦ (I pressed 5.)
You have reached First Nationalized Bank. If you know the extension of the person youāre trying to reach, you may enter it now. (Silenceā¦) To return to the main menu, press 7. To hear a duck quack, press 8. (Silenceā¦) To speak with an operator, press 0. (I pressed 0.)
Ringā¦ ringā¦ ringā¦ No one is available to take your callā¦ But we value your businessā¦ If youād like to leave a message pressā¦ (Click)
I figured maybe it wasnāt a good time, and decided to try back a little later. Mornings are probably busy times for banks. No reason to make any snap judgments based on just that one attempt.
Plus, Iām of a mind to give the banks a break. Theyāve had a very tough year. Giving out all those bonuses is time consuming. Itās not like theyāre direct deposits you know? And thatās to say nothing of the envelopes. Whoās going to lick all those envelopes, huh? And the TARP money? Hey, you think all those billions just store themselves? No sir, someone has to store all that money away somewhere.
Then, when you add in all the time it takes to get the sub-prime borrowers evicted and onto the streets where they belongā¦ all that crying and sobbingā¦ please Mr. Bankerā¦ pleaseā¦ weāll pay soonā¦ pleaseā¦ it gives me a headache just thinking about it. I mean, if I just picked up a bonus check for a couple of millionā¦ Iām sure I want to go deal with some dead beat who couldnāt even handle it when his mortgage payment doubled over a couple of monthsā¦ like, deal with it peopleā¦ Iām booked on the 7:05 to Maui and I donāt have time for your whiningā¦ like I saidā¦ Iām quite sure itās been hectic.
The only saving grace has been that at least the banks didnāt have to worry about making loans to actual customersā¦ and do all that other stuff.
I remember that Citibank laid off likeā¦ I donāt knowā¦ what was itā¦ two million people? And I heard that David Rosenberg, who used to be the Chief Economist at Merrill Lynch, is now working as a teller at B of A. So, thereāve been some very significant changes at most banks for sure.
Heck, Citi even had to cancel the purchase of one of its Lear Jets that had been on order. See how dangerous all that populism crap is? You let that stuff get out of control and next thing you know bankers are going to start forcing executives to drive the Mercedes instead of the Bentley. Itās dangerous. Itās socialism. Itās a slippery slope.
Soā¦ letās give First Nationalized Bank a break on that first call and talk about something else. Weāll try them back in 15 minutes, howās that?
You may remember this past year there was a study released that showed that loan modifications were re-defaulting at the rate of like 60% within the first year after being modified. It sort of came across like proof that sub-prime borrowers shouldnāt have been allowed to buy their homes in the first place, because apparently even if you modified their loans, they still couldnāt make their payments. Ah ha! I knew it! Dead beats, one and all.
I saw the study. It was actually two studies. One done by Credit Suisse and the other by the Swiss banking giant, UBS. (Uā¦ BS. I love that name.)
The total number of mortgages in both studies, as I remember it, was right around 1400. And roughly 40% ā 60% of the loans defaulted in six months depending on the exact circumstances, but the point was the same either way. A lot of modified loans defaulted, or rather re-defaultedā¦ that was the point.
I immediately wanted to figure out why that would be the case. Why, you ask? Iām not sureā¦ it just seemed like an awfully high percentage in an awfully short period of time. I mean, even hard core dead beats make it more than six months, right? A year, maybe?
So, I dove in to the data, trying to see if there were any reoccurring themes that would lead me to that āAh ha!ā moment for which I was hoping. I tried to see if there were any patterns as far as the borrowers were concernedā¦ but nothing popped out. I tried to see if the numbers presented a path to followā¦ again nothing looked indicative of anything special. I even tried to find out the average credit scores or whether there was a geographical consistency, like maybe a whole bunch of the borrowers lived in Michigan. Nope, nothing.
So, feeling a little bit lost, I called a friend of mine who used to be a big time corporate treasurer at a Fortune 100 company. Heās smart as a whip, and I wanted to see if he had any ideas. He didnāt. But he did offer to refer me to a senior executive at PIMCO, which to me sounded like the transmission place āAamco,ā but without the horn honking at the end. The CEOās name is Bill Gross, and heās a zillionaire.
PIMCO is like the worldās largest bond holder, or something like that. I never even bothered to look them up. I just called the woman my friend recommended and said hello.
My friend was rightā¦ she was double sharp and knew everything about the whole mortgage mess. When I mentioned the bond ratings agencies she immediately got hot under the collar. She almost raised her voice saying āThey should be in jail.ā
āReally,ā I said. āHow so?ā And she went on to explain the intricacies of the bond market as it related to securitization and derivatives. She laughed towards the end of her rant, which woke me up and luckily she wasnāt asking a question so I was free to get back at my original topic of interest: loan modifications.
She had no idea why borrowers would default in such high numbers and so quickly. She did however express surprise that the investors had let Credit Suisse or UBS modify their loans, and she told me that PIMCO wouldnāt let one of their servicers do that.
I asked why, a little hesitantly now, and she explainedā¦
āThe banks donāt own the loans,ā she explained. āInvestors like PIMCO do, and why would an investor allow a servicer to cut into their profitability, just because someone wasnāt making the payments on their mortgage?ā Foreclose, was her answer. I mentioned that the costs of foreclosure in this market were rather high, but she wasnāt having any of it. Foreclose, and thatās that. Well alrighty thenā¦ interesting.
Then I suggested that a cost comparison could be done using a net present value calculation as compared with the costs of foreclosure and her attitude changed.
āOh, wellā¦ that would be different, I suppose,ā she was clearly softening at the mere mention of a ānet present value calculation,ā bond people are so easy. āIf someone showed us a net present value calculation as compared with a foreclosure costs and the data was solid, I suppose weād have to take a look at it.ā Bingo.
Maybe this would be a good time to try First Nationalized Bank again. What do you think? No? Okay, letās give them a few more minutes, then weāll call back. Iām sure weāll get someone. Anderson Cooper said so.
I thanked my new net present value oriented friend and hung up. Next I would need to find a homeowner whose loan had been modified directly by the bank as a result of their request. This wasnāt easy. Lots of refinancing, but no modifications. Finally, I found an older gentleman who said that he asked his bank about modifying his mortgage and they did.
āPerfect,ā I said to him on the phone. āHowās tomorrow?ā
The next day I found myself driving out to Palm Springs. It was crisp and sunnyā¦ a beautiful day and I was anxious to see how he had done it and why he had chosen to do so. I spent the entire afternoon with the old guy; we drank a couple of martinis and drove around a golf course in his private cart. It was fun and I genuinely liked him. He told me how it went, and answered all of my questions. I started to think that maybe the banks werenāt so bad after all.
As I was leaving, I stopped by a glass case by the hallway leading to the homeās main door. There was a plaque that read āEmployee of the Yearā¦ Bank of Americaā¦ 1965.ā Uh oh. āWere you with Bank of America before you retiredā I called out to him. āYes,ā he replied, ā44 years,ā he said with great pride. So, I guess when you called B of A for your loan modification, you knew exactly who to call, right? And they took your call because they saw it was you, right?ā
āOh absolutely,ā he said. I was the Senior Vice President of Consumer Loans and Mortgages for 21 yearsā¦ when I retired, there were more than 1,000 people at my party. They held it at our loan-processing center in Pasadena. Want to see some pictures?”
āMaybe next time,ā I said. It was getting lateā¦ so, I said my goodbyes and got back on the road toward home, kicking myself that I hadnāt thought to ask about that before driving for two hours to interview Mr. Bank of America Ret. Oh wellā¦ people are losing their homes to foreclosure, who am I to complain about a little extra driving.
Alright, so letās give old First Nationalized Bank a callā¦ it has to work, the guy on Sixty Minutes was sure of it. And even President Obama said we wouldnāt need to pay anyone for helpā¦ okay, one more tryā¦. here goesā¦ dialing nowā¦
Ringā¦ ringā¦ ringā¦ Thank you for calling First Nationalized Bank. If you know the extension of the person you are calling you may enter it now. For the company directory, press 9. (Silenceā¦)
If you are calling about a checking or savings account, press 1. For credit cards, press 2. Other callers, press 3.
I pressed 3.Ā (Ringā¦ ringā¦ ringā¦.) You have reached First Nationalized Bank. For questions about loans press 5ā¦ for questions (I pressed 5)
You have reached First Nationalized Bank. If you know the extension of the person youāre trying to reach, you may enter it now. (Silenceā¦) To return to the main menu, press 1. (Silenceā¦) To speak with an operator, press 0. (I pressed 0)
Ringā¦ ringā¦ ringā¦ No one is available to take your callā¦ If youād like to leave a message pressā¦ (Click)
~~~
Okay, this is embarrassingā¦ maybe I should have tried this earlierā¦ donāt get impatient; weāve got a lot more to cover anyway. Besides itās getting close to lunchtime, maybe thatās the problemā¦ they probably donāt answer as many calls around lunchtime.
So, getting back to my analysis of the disappointing loan modification dataā¦ through several interviews with borrowers and a few with bankers, I was able to ascertain what I referred to as my ā7 Points of Blightā behind the high re-default percentages. It wasnāt the borrowers that caused the high numbers of re-defaults, it was the nature of the transactions. Banks simply were not handling loan modifications effectively, and none of the reasons for this should be the least bit difficult to understand.
Banks Negotiating Directly With Borrowers: 7 Points of Blight
1. Banks have a hard time getting in touch with distressed borrowers. As in: āHoney, itās the bank.ā āTell them Iām not here.ā Or mail that goes unopened. Itās just not that easy for a bank to get in touch with someone who is four months or more behind on their mortgage payments. And in many instances, by the time the bank did reach the borrower, it was often too late to stop the foreclosure process.
~~~
2. Banks and loan servicers today are anything but overstaffed, as one might imagine. They certainly havenāt upsized this past year, right? So, as an industry, they simply donāt have the additional staff sitting around trained to handle loan modifications.
~~~
3. Banks and servicers are set up to process tens or hundreds of thousands of mortgage statements and handle routine foreclosures and collectionsā¦ all processes made possible by systems, more so than people. Loan modifications, however, are like a hand made car. One at a timeā¦ working with the borrowerā¦ putting the package together for submission to the lenderā¦ as a process it bears little resemblance to routine mortgage processing.
~~~
4. Perhaps most importantly, I was able to determine that the negotiation between a bank and a borrower at risk of losing their home is not a negotiation at all. Itās more like having a gun to your head. Being at risk of losing a home is nothing if not frightening. Distressed homeowners who received an offer from their bank that allowed them to stay in their homes, too often, jumped at itā¦ and understandably so. After all, I realized, if I was going to lose my home to foreclosure, I suppose six months from now beats the heck out of next week, right?
~~~
5. Systems were lacking, as well. Banks and servicers had robust systems to handle the processing of payments, normal collections and even foreclosures, but loan modifications were another animal altogether. And few in the industry were prepared to invest in a system enhancement that would likely only be used for a couple of years. If you were a mortgage lender or loan servicer, would you invest in systems and people to handle loan modifications, when you saw that such modifications will only be a factor for a limited number of years? Exactly.
~~~
6.Investors are reticent to give banks and loan servicers the authority to write down their assets. No standardized guidelines exist, and investors need criteria upon which such decisions are to be made. Otherwise, it seems safer to foreclose.ā
~~~
7. Compensation was another issue. Banks servicing mortgages are being paid to do so, but they werenāt being paid to handle loan modifications, and investors that we spoke with all indicated that in their opinion, mortgage servicers were over paid when times were good in order to cover times that were not. In other words, the investors werenāt all that hot on the idea of paying the banks anything extra to modify loans in order to avoid foreclosure.
~~~
When I finished my analysis of why so many borrowers were re-defaulting six months after their loans were modified by their lender or mortgage servicer, I went around testing my theories with everyone who would listen. And guess what?
Everyone agreed, most said something equivalent to āDuhā¦ like, of course.ā
Meanwhile, the stories about modified loans re-defaulting were showing up everywhere. In fact, it was becoming an urban legend, for a while anyway. Iād show up at a meeting, the sub-prime crisis would come up and within a minute, someone would bring up the Credit Suisse or UBS data. Most of the time the person bringing it up didnāt even know from where the stats came. All they knew was that modified loans were re-defaulting 60% of the time after just six months. And that made homeowners at fault. How could they not beā¦ if 60% of them couldnāt even make it six months after modification, although not much of a modification, if you ask me.
I went ahead and called First Nationalized Bank again, just in case the phone lines had cleared up, but obviously they must be having some kind of problem over there. It canāt be the norm, can it? Assuming it was just a bad phone day, I stopped in at a bank to see if they could answer a few questions about President Obamaās plan to rescue the housing market.
They said they didnāt know anything. Just that the paperwork hadnāt been sent out to banks as yet. One of the guys who worked for the bank asked me a few questions and I fielded them all. I gave them the government phone number from the Treasury Website, and I told them this:
āWhatever you do, donāt hang upā¦ no matter how many times it rings, stay on holdā¦ or they put you all the way back at the end of the lineā¦ so even if it takes an hourā¦ just wait thereā¦ theyāll answer, it just takes time. And once they do, itāll be really helpfulā¦ youāll love it, they answer everythingā¦ā
Then I got into my car and laughed the buttons off my shirtā¦ Youāve got to have a hobbyā¦ I think Iām going to take up making fun of banks.
For want of a refi the payment was lost.
For want of a payment the mortgage was lost.
For want of a mortgage the house was lost.
From too many lost houses the market was lost.
For want of a housing market the financial sector was lost.
For want of a financial sector the credit markets were lost.
For want of the credit markets the economy was lost.
For want of the economy prosperity was lost.
For want of prosperity the country was lost.
And all for the want of a sustainable loan modification?
~~~
Mandelman out.